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THE VALIDITY OF AIRPORT ZONING ORDINANCES
T HE PROBLEM of distinguishing between valid restrictions on the
use of land under the police power and unconstitutional taking of
property for public use without compensation has long troubled the
courts. This problem has been particularly evident in the case of
airport zoning ordinances which seek to prevent interference with
airport operations by imposing height and use restrictions on sur-
rounding land. A majority of the state courts considering the per se
validity of these ordinances has declared them repugnant to state
or federal constitutional "taking" provisions.'
THE POLICE POWER CONCEPT
It is settled that physical invasion or appropriation of private
property by the government constitutes a "taking" for which "just
compensation" must be paid.2 A government regulation such as a
zoning ordinance, which involves no physical appropriation, is not
prima facie a taking. The government may regulate property
under the police power without paying compensation to those regu-
lated.3 However, to be a valid exercise of the police power a regula-
I Most ordinances have been invalidated as violative of both state and federal con-
stitutional provisions. Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949 U.S. Av. 1 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1948); Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964); Indiana Toll
Rd. Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1963), cert. dismissed, 379
U.S. 487 (1965); Mutual Chem. Co. of America v. Mayor of Baltimore, 1939 U.S. Av.
11 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1939); [1937-1938] MICH. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 257. Contra,
Waring v. Peterson, 137 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Harrell's Candy Kitchen,
Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959); cf. United
States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1944).
One ordinance has been held unreasonable as applied. Banks v. Fayette County
Bd. of Airport Zoning Appeals, 313 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1958) (ordinance excluding all
commercial uses held arbitrary and unreasonable because apartment houses and hos-
pitals allowed). Others have been deemed repugnant to a state statute. Yara Eng'r
Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (ordinance invalid
as not authorized by enabling statute); Rice v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 387, 40 A.2d
561 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (same).
2 E.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871); see U.S. CONST.
amend. V and amend. XIV, § I.
"[Wjhere real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth,
sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the
Constitution .... ." Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., supra at 181.
8See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (city ordi-
nance prohibiting industrial use of property within specified areas of city); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408 (1915) (ordinance prohibiting brick manufacturing
tion must satisfy several vaguely enunciated tests. (1) It must be
imposed in order to promote the general ends of public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare4 and (2) must be reasonably neces-
sary and related to the furtherance of one such end.5 (3) Further,
the regulation must not deprive the landowner of every beneficial
use of his property,6 and (4) it must confer upon the public a benefit
which is on balance commensurate with the burden imposed on
private property.1
Regulations failing to satisfy these tests when applied to par-
ticular property have been consistently invalidated as transgressing
the bounds of the police power.8 In such cases it has been held that
the regulation effects a "taking" to the extent that it diminishes the
value of the subject property and is unconstitutional absent payment
of just compensation to the owner.9
within specified areas upheld as applied to existing brickyard); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887) (statute prohibting manufacture of intoxicating liquors upheld as
applied to owner of existing brewery); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (city ordi-
nance prohibiting rock and gravel quarrying within specified areas).
'E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-33 (1954); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 3, at 395;
City of San Antonio v. Pidgeonhole Parking, Inc., 158 Tex. 318, 325, 311 S.W.2d 218,
219 (1958); see Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 306, 330
P.2d 5, 16 (1958).
rSee, e.g., State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 436,
441, 254 P.2d 29, 32 (1953); Serve Yourself Gasoline Stations Ass'n v. Brock, 39 Cal.
2d 813, 817, 249 P.2d 545, 548 (1952), appeal dismissed, 345 U.S. 980 (1953); Dutton
v. Mendocino County, 1949 U.S. Av. 1, 14 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1948); Bond Bros. v. Louis-
ville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky. 689, 699, 211 S.W.2d 867,
872 (1948), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 943 (1950).
6 See, e.g., Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wis. 213, 1 N.W.2d 84 (1941). "For in-
stance, the police power may limit the height of buildings, in a city, without com-
pensation. To that extent it cuts down what otherwise would be the rights of prop-
erty. But if it should attempt to limit the height so far as to make an ordinary
building lot wholly useless, the rights of property would prevail over the other public
interest, and the police power would fail. To set such a limit would need compensa-
tion and the power of eminent domain." Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349, 355 (1908). (Emphasis added.)
7 E.g., Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71, 75-76, 95 A.2d 122, 125 (1953); Milwaukie
Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 307, 330 P.2d 5, 17 (1958); see
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922).
SE.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (ordinance not reasonably
related to the public welfare); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra note 7 (benefit
to public not commensurate with burden on private property); Eubanks v. City of
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (ordinance not reasonably related to the public welfare).
9 See, e.g., Grosso v. Board of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 630, 61 A.2d 167 (1948); State
ex rel. George v. Hull, 65 Wyo. 251, 199 P.2d 832 (1948); cases cited note 8 supra.
The measure of damages for injury to property by government action is, in general,
the difference between the fair market value of the property before and after the in-
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THE AIRPORT ZONING CASES
While the airport zoning cases have utilized the police power
tests to evaluate the ordinances as applied, these decisions in general
have transcended the police power rationale and found ordinances
invalid per se. The Florida Supreme Court has been the only tri-
bunal to hold such ordinances valid.10 In the dispositive case, the
Florida court found in the challenged ordinance a promotion of
public safety accorded to both area residents and users of the airport
facilities." Further, the court concluded that the general welfare
of the state and community was served by the ordinance.1 2 In the
majority of cases, however, airport zoning ordinances have been in-
validated per se, and on various grounds.13 The first case to con-
sider such an ordinance, Mutual Chem. Co. of America v. Mayor
of Baltimore4 held the ordinance invalid as benefitting only users
of aerial transportation rather than the general public.15 A Cali-
jury. E.g., Snyder v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 144 Neb. 808, 18
N.W.2d 160 (1944); Armstrong v. City of Seattle, 18D Wash. 39, 38 P.2d 377 (1934).
" Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So. 2d
439 (Fla. 1959).
1 Id. at 444-45; accord, Waring v. Peterson, 137 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962).
See also United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1944).
There a verdict of no damages in a condemnation proceeding to obtain an easement
of flight over defendant's land was upheld on grounds that the present use of land
would not seriously be interfered with and that the height of structures on the
land was already restricted by an airport zoning ordinance. In Banks v. Fayette
County Bd. of Airport Zoning Appeals, 313 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1958), an ordinance was
held unreasonable as applied to the plaintiff, but airport zoning ordinances in gen-
eral were not declared invalid.
" Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Air Authority, 111 So. 2d 439,
443 (Fla. 1959).
"The validity of an airport zoning ordinance was first considered by the Attorney
General of Michigan in 1937. He recommended that the Michigan governor veto as
unconstitutional an act of the legislature restricting the erection of structures on land
surrounding airports, considering the act to effect the taking of an easement over
the restricted land. [1937-1938] MICH. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 257. This view of
per se invalidity of height restrictions seems erroneous, since such restrictions have
been upheld in other contexts for more than fifty years. See Welch v. Swasey, 214
U.S. 91 (1909); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 963 (1949), and cases therein cited. Further, the
case relied upon as authority by the Attorney General, Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586,
194 N.W. 159 (1923), may be read as holding height restrictions invalid only where
they are imposed solely for the benefit of a building owned by the state and not void
per se. See id. at 594-98, 194 N.W. at 162-63.
-1 1939 U.S. Av. 11 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1939).
"'Id. at 16. The Maryland court also asserted that the restrictions upon the land-
owner in effect made impossible the erection of any building upon the land and was
thus "too extreme" to be imposed without payment of compensation. Id. at 15-16.
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fornia court in Dutton v. Mendocino County0 subsequently cited
the Mutual Chem. Co. case for the proposition that airport zoning
ordinances are invalid per se because they conferred no benefit upon
the general public.'7  While tacitly sanctioning the public benefit
test, the Dutton court chose to rely on the rationale of United States
v. Causby,18 in which the Supreme Court had held that a landowner
has a property interest in the air space immediately above his land
for the physical violation of which he must be compensated. 9 The
Dutton court invoked Causby to buttress its holding that an ordi-
nance restricting the height of buildings on the plaintiff's land in
order to permit aircraft to use overhead air space constituted the
"taking" of an easement across the land and was unconstitutional
without payment of compensation.20
Later cases invalidating airport zoning ordinances have not been
posited on lack of benefit to the general public.2 ' Rather, relying
on Causby and a later decision 22 for the proposition that a landowner
has a constitutionally protected interest in the air space above his
land,23 these cases have purported to distinguish " 'between zoning
regulations which merely restrict the enjoyment and use of prop-
erty' " and those which effect a " 'taking of property for a public use
for which compensation must be paid.' "24 The test posed for de-
terming whether a zoning ordinance merely restricts the use of prop-
erty or effects a taking was asserted to be whether private property
16 1949 U.S. Av. 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1948).
71d. at 14.
18 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
1 0 Id. at 264-65. The Causby Court found a violation of a landowner's air space
due to airplane operations immediately above the property. The Supreme Court
ruled that "the landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground
as he can occupy or use in connection with the land." Id. at 264.
20 1949 U.S. Av. at 11-13. The court also grounded its decision on the absence of
any showing that the ordinance was necessary to promote the public safety, id. at 14,
and that the diminution of the value of the property was so extreme as to constitute
a "taking," id. at 11.
2" Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964); Indiana Toll Rd.
Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1963), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S.
487 (1965).
22 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
21 See id. at 88-89; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264-65.
2 Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 564-, 394 P.2d 641, 645 (1964), quoting
Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 581, 193 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1963).
In Roark v. City of Caldwell, supra, part of the plaintiff's land had been restricted
to agricultural uses. The Idaho court held these and the height restrictions invalid,
applying the same test to both. 87 Idaho at 566-67, 394 P.2d at 646-47.
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rights are " 'actually destroyed'" or are "'taken from the individual
and conferred upon the public for public use.' "2r Thus, under this
test if a zoning ordinance merely "destroys" property rights, the
ordinance, if otherwise unobjectionable, will constitute a valid ex-
ercise of the police power. However, if the ordinance, in addition
to destroying private property rights, also establishes public rights
in the property and thus "transfers property rights" from the indi-
vidual to the public for public use, it will be struck down per se as
a taking of property without compensation. 20  This distinction be-
tween "destruction" and "public use" of property derives its lexicon
and form from traditional police power concepts, but has become a
generic airport zoning doctrine.
RATIONALE OF ZONING INVALIDATION
Airport zoning ordinances have thus been invalidated on a variety
of grounds. Apart from the finding in the Dutton case that the
ordinance was enacted in order to grant airplanes the physical use
of the air space above the zoned land,27 Dutton and other cases in-
validating airport zoning ordinances rested primarily on two
grounds: earlier cases held that airport zoning ordinances are for
the benefit of users of aerial transportation rather than the general
public,28 while more current decisions reasoned that airport zoning
ordinances confer property rights upon the public for public use
rather than "merely destroying" such rights. 29
2 Id. at 561-62, 394 P.2d at 643, quoting Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d
400, 408, 348 P.2d 664, 669 (1960). See Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n v. Jankovich, supra
note 24, at 581-82, 193 N.E.2d at 240. In that case, the court did not formulate a test
for determining which regulations "merely restrict the enjoyment and use" of prop-
erty and which regulations effect a "taking," though the court apparently had in mind
a test similar to the one stated in the above case.
2'See Roark v. City of Caldwell, supra note 24, at 561-62, 394 P.2d at 643.
27 1949 U.S. Av. at 11-13. For a discussion of this ground see text accompanying
notes 44-56, infra.
28 Id. at 1. The first case to hold that airport zoning ordinances benefited only
users of aerial transportation was Mutual Chem. Co. of America. See notes 14-15
supra and accompanying text.
20 Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964); Indiana Toll Rd.
Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1963), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S.
487 (1965).
Holdings in other cases have been based upon the particular facts present. Banks
v. Fayette County Bd. of Airport Zoning Appeals, 313 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1958) (ordi-
nance excluding all commercial uses held arbitrary and unreasonable because apart-
ment houses and hospitals allowed); Yara Eng'r Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L.
370, 40 A.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (ordinance invalid as not authorized by enabling
statute); Rice v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 387, 40 A.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (same).
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A. Lack of Benefit to the General Public
The holdings that airport zoning ordinances are invalid because
they benefit users of aerial transportation rather than the general
public seem clearly unfounded. It is an accepted tenet that the
police power may validly be exercised only for the benefit of the
general public as opposed to a special group or class.80 However, even
if only users of aerial transportation derive benefit from airport
zoning ordinances, and even if their number be considered so small
as to constitute a special class, the general public may at times bene-
fit from a regulation protecting the interests of a particular group.3 1
Clearly this is so when regulations are enacted to protect the lives
and safety of a substantial portion of the public.32  Moreover, users
of aerial transportation are in fact not the only beneficiaries of
airport zoning ordinances. The safety of those living in the area
is promoted by limiting the height of buildings and prohibiting
uses which would endanger airplanes landing and taking off. Fur-
thermore, the welfare of the entire community is furthered by en-
abling people to travel by air to and from the community in safety,
thereby enhancing commercial development.33 Recent decisions
have not applied the public benefit test,3 4 which indicates that its
persuasiveness has waned in light of the counter arguments which
have been interposed.
B. Destruction or Public Use of Property
It is difficult to evaluate the reasoning which buttresses the hold-
ings that airport zoning ordinances are invalid as conferring property
rights upon the public for public use rather than merely destroying
00 E.g., Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distrib. Co., 202 Ga. 559, 43 S.E.2d 704
(1947); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
8 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (statute ex-
tending time under existing mortgage foreclosure and sale held valid); Ballarini v.
Schlage Lock Co., 226 P.2d 771 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Cal. 1950) (statute requiring
employers to allow employees time off to vote without reducing wages upheld);
People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App. Div. 141, 63 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1946) (same).
82 Cf. Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954), where an ordinance
authorizing flouridation of city water to reduce tooth decay in persons under sixteen
years of age was held valid. The Oklahoma court found that the group benefiting
from the ordinance was a substantial proportion of the public.
88 See Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So.
2d 439, 443 (Fla. 1959).
34 See Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964); Indiana Toll
Rd. Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1962), cert. dismissed, 379
U.S. 487 (1965).
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them. This "test" is not one which has traditionally been applied
in police power cases, and judicial articulation of its foundations is
not clear. Where "public use" connotes actual physical "use by
the public," there is an isolable distinction between governmental
action which merely "destroys" property rights and governmental
action which grants the public the "use" of property.35 As thus
limited, this "test" merely states the conceptual distinction between
"regulating" and "taking." It has not provided a discernable an-
alytic base for reviewing airport zoning ordinances. These ordi-
nances do not grant the public the physical use of any property
rights.36 The only way in which the public can be said to "use"
the property right of which the landowner is deprived is by virtue
of the fact that the public receives the benefit of the landowner's
deprivation. However, this does not appear to be the meaning
which the courts have placed upon "public use." All zoning regula-
tions deprive the landowner of property rights in order to benefit
the public. As applied in the airport zoning cases the "test" of
destruction-or-public-use of property rights appears to be merely a
formula for stating the result that an ordinance is or is not a taking,
rather than a test for determining that result.
C. The Governmental Enterprise Theory
It has been suggested37 that the cases invalidating airport zoning
ordinances can be explained by a formula which can be applied in
all zoning cases: where a landowner is deprived of property rights
by a regulation enhancing the value of some governmental enter-
prise (such as an airport), the regulation will be characterized as
a taking for which compensation is required. However, where the
regulation merely resolves conflicting interests in a private sector of
35 For example, an ordinance imposing building set-back restrictions for aesthetic
purposes would merely "destroy" property rights-the landowner would be deprived
of the right to use part of his land for building purposes, but no right to use that
portion of the land would be granted to the public. However, an ordinance im-
posing building set-back restrictions in order to grant to the public an easement of
passage across the land would "confer property rights upon the public for public
use,"-there would be a transfer of property rights to the public and, therefore, a
"taking."
36Where there are continuous overflights at low altitudes, as where the regulated
land is situated at the end of an airport runway, it has been held that there is a
physical use of the air space and, consequently, a taking. Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). However, it is the
actual physical invasion and not the zoning ordinance which effects the taking.
37 See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 86, 67-69 (1964).
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society, no compensation is required, for private citizens rather than
a governmental enterprise derive the benefit.38 As applied to the
airport zoning cases, however, this test provides neither predictive
validity nor a rational basis for resolution of future cases. This
can best be illustrated by viewing previous decisions in govern-
mental enterprise terms.
It is true that all the airports involved in these cases have been
government-owned.3 9 Moreover, these airports benefited econom-
ically from the zoning ordinances in the sense that, had no zoning
ordinance been enacted, the airport would have been forced to pay
compensation to surrounding landowners to prevent their inter-
ference with airport operations. However, under the governmental
enterprise test, an exception is made in the case of "incidental"
benefits to a government enterprise: 40 where a zoning regulation is
8 Id. at 67.
"[The] . . . answer suggested here requires an attempt to isolate and define the
two different kinds of private economic loss resulting from government activity and
the two different respective roles played by the government in the process of comple-
tion from which these losses arise. This analysis rests upon the distinction between the
role of government as participant and the government as mediator in the process of
competition among economic claims. The losses to individual property owners arising
from government activity of the first type result in a benefit to a government enterprise;
losses arising from the second type of activity are the result of government mediating
conflicts between competing private economic claims and produces no benefit to any
governmental enterprise.
"In addition to its enterprise capacity, in which government acquires resources for
its own account, government also plays another and quite different role. It 'governs.'
That is, it mediates the disputes of various citizens and groups within the society,
and it resolves the conflict among competing and conflicting alternatives. Typically
in this function it says, as between neighbors, that one fellow must cease keeping
pigs in his backyard .... The essence of this function is that the government serves
only as arbiter, defining standards to reconcile differences among the private interests
in the community." Id. at 62-63.
:0 See Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949 U.S. Av. at 2; Roark v. City of Caldwell,
87 Idaho 557, 558, 394 P.2d 641, 642 (1964); Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n v. Jankovich,
244 Ind. 574, 575-76, 193 N.E.2d 237, 238 (1963), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 487 (1965);
Mutual Chem. Co. of America v. Mayor of Baltimore, 1939 U.S. Av. at 15. The air-
ports involved in the Florida cases were apparently also government-owned. See
Waring v. Peterson, 137 So. 2d 268, 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Harrell's Candy
Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, Ill So. 2d 439, 440 n.1 (2) (Fla.
1959).
'oAn example of an incidental benefit might be afforded in the case of a hypo-
thetical town which passes an ordinance requiring all mining properties to be
operated so as to maintain subjacent support for all adjacent property, and a state
highway adjoins a mine. The value of a governmental enterprise, the highway, is
enhanced, but the government might be merely the incidental beneficiary of a regula-
tion enacted to protect private landowners whose property adjoins a mine. See Sax,
supra note 37, at 74.
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enacted essentially to resolve conflicting private interests, no com-
pensation is required if the governmental enterprise merely benefits
"incidentally" and in common with all the private citizens of the
community.41 Consequently, in any case where both a govern-
mental enterprise and the general public benefit from a zoning
ordinance there must be an inquiry into whether or not the benefit
to the governmental enterprise is "incidental." In factual applica-
tion, this dual benefit will be present in all situations involving a
governmental benefit, since the general public presumably profits
from any benefit to a governmental enterprise.
It is not clear under the incidental benefit exception whether
the purpose of the ordinance or merely its economic consequences
are to be considered; that is, whether the benefit to the governmental
enterprise is incidental when the primary purpose of the ordinance
is to resolve conflicting private interests regardless of tangible benefit
to government enterprise, or whether the benefit is incidental when
the primary economic effect of the ordinance is the benefit to
private interests. In either event, airport zoning ordinances would
appear to fall within the incidental benefit exception to the govern-
mental benefit test. While airports clearly benefit from airport
zoning ordinances, neither the primary purpose nor the primary
effect of these ordinances is to benefit the airport. The primary
purposes of the airport zoning ordinances would seem to be to
promote safety for aerial transportation users and the safety of those
living in the vicinity of the airport, and to promote the general
welfare by encouraging aerial commerce, rather than to stimulate
the business of the airport.42  Similarly, the primary economic
benefit from the ordinance would seem to accrue not to the airport
but to the general public. Improved air safety results in fewer
airplane accidents and their attendant economic losses to society,
and also results in the stimulation of commerce to the benefit of
the community. It thus appears that the governmental benefit
test, even if assumed to be a valid one, does not explain the airport
cases. Further, its application in these cases founders on the attempt
to sever analytically two basically covariant entities, the government
itself and the public polity which it serves.
" Ibid.
"See Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111
So. 2d 439, 443 (Fla. 1959).
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D. The Invasion of Air Space Rationale
Since the decisions invalidating airport zoning ordinances can-
not satisfactorily be explained by traditional police power tests43 or
by any new police power test of general applicability, it appears that
the real bases for these decisions are policy considerations not in-
volved in the usual zoning case. These considerations are revealed
and given emphasis by the finding in the Dutton case that the
ordinance was enacted in order to permit airplanes to use the air
space above the zoned land.44  The court held that to permit such
use without compensation would be inconsistent with the case of
United States v. Causby.45 The later cases46 also relied heavily
upon Causby and upon the case of Griggs v. Allegheny County,47
both of which held that a landowner has a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in the air space above his land for the physical viola-
tion of which he must be compensated.
48
The decisions thus appear to reflect the conclusion that airport
zoning ordinances are an attempt to avoid paying the compensation
required by Causby and Griggs.49 If there were a zoning ordinance
prohibiting use by the landowner of the very air space subsequently
invaded by aircraft, the limitations imposed by the ordinance would
43There has been some application of traditional police power tests, but no
definitive pattern has been exhibited. See notes 15, 20 supra.
44 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
" 328 U.S. 256 (1946). For the facts of Causby see text accompanying note 48 infra.
The actual ground of the Causby decision was that the invaded air space had not
been declared by Congress to be in the public domain. See 328 U.S. at 263-64.
There was no square holding by the Supreme Court that the government cannot
appropriate air space without payment of compensation until 1962, when the Court
held on similar facts that there had been a taking despite the fact that Congress had
declared the invaded air space to be within the public domain. Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
6 Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964); Indiana Toll Rd.
Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1963), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S.
487 (1965).
" 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
48 In both Causby and Griggs, owners of land adjacent to government airports
sued the government for damages caused by continuous low-level airplane flights.
The Supreme Court in both cases held that a landowner has title to as much of the
air space above his land as he can make beneficial use of and that continuous physical
invasion by the airplanes constituted the taking of an easement for which the land-
owner must be compensated. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. at 88-90; United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264-66. The Court in Griggs so ruled despite the fact
that Congress had declared the violated air space to be in the public domain. 72 Stat.
739, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1964).
"0 As Causby and Griggs involved physical invasions, they are readily distinguish-
able from the airport zoning cases. See note 36 supra.
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dictate that the landowner would be entitled at best only to nominal
compensation for the invasion" in the absence of additional factors
such as excessive smoke or noise. The courts apparently feel that
to allow such a result would be inconsistent with the Griggs case,
where the fact that Congress had declared the invaded air space to
be in the public domain was not mentioned as a relevant factor in
assessing damages.51
A RATIONALE FOR VALIDATION
In order to effectuate the policy of the Griggs and Causby cases
it is not necessary to invalidate per se an airport zoning ordinance
in its entirety. The traditional "police power" tests offer the land-
owner sufficient protection.52 The fact that the courts anticipate a
subsequent physical invasion of the air space over some of the regu-
lated property does not necessitate invalidation of an ordinance per
se, thus giving more protection to the landowner than would other-
wise be required. The per se validity of airport zoning ordinances
should be determined by means of the traditional "police power"
tests. If the ordinance is upheld with respect to a particular land-
owner, that landowner in any subsequent physical invasion case
will still be entitled to compensation to the extent that the physical
invasion imposes upon the property burdens which are greater than
those imposed by the zoning ordinance. 53
Under such an approach the only thing which the landowner
will have lost is compensation for the bare loss of air space itself.
;0 See United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1944).
51 See 369 U.S. at 85.
The rationale implicit in Causby and Griggs also explains the holdings that use
restrictions on land surrounding an airport are invalid. See Roark v. City of Caldwell,
87 Idaho 557, 564-67, 394 P.2d 641, 645-47 (1964). In Causby the landowner was
awarded compensation for actual damage to his business caused by the overflights. If
the use of land surrounding an airport were to be severely restricted (in Roark
portions of the land were limited to agricultural uses, id. at 560, 394 P.2d at 642), the
possibility of such damages being incurred would be greatly reduced.
52 See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra. If a particular airport zoning ordinance
deprives a landowner of every beneficial use of his property or if it imposes upon
him a burden which is unreasonable when measured against the benefit to the public,
it is invalid with respect to that particular landowner under traditional police
power tests. Such a situation would arise in the usual airport ordinance case only
where land is situated under the glidepath of airplanes using the airport and the
height restrictions imposed are so extreme as to prevent a landowner from making
any substantial beneficial use of his property.
" For example, where invading airplanes cause excessive smoke or noise this
damage is compensable in a tortious action for trespass.
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Moreover, if this loss is unreasonable the landowner will be entitled
to compensation under traditional "police power" tests.54  It is
difficult to justify the compensation of a landowner for mere loss
of air space rights due to airport zoning restrictions when he is not
entitled to compensation for such a loss under similar height and
use restrictions designed to further such purposes as prevention of
fire hazards.55
An alternate method according even more weight to the policy
of the Griggs and Causby cases would be to evaluate airport zoning
ordinances by traditional "police power" tests, but in any subsequent
eminent domain case to assess damages on the basis of the fair market
value of the land before the existence of the zoning ordinance. Such
a tack would compensate the landowner for restrictions imposed by
the zoning ordinances whenever they are followed by a physical
invasion. However, to allow compensation for the loss of fair market
value only to those landowners whose air space is physically violated
appears anomalous, since the same restrictions are applied to all.
However, this method is in line with the cases which suggest that
whether or not a "taking" occurs when the value of property is
" See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra.
Il See, e.g., Rohrs v. Zabriskie, 102 N.J.L. 473, 133 Ad. 65 (1926); Atkinson v. Piper,
181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 963 (1949).
For an example of the suggested approach, see McCarthy v. City of Manhattan
Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), when plaintiffs' beach property, upon which
plaintiffs planned to build houses, was restricted to recreational uses. After holding
the ordinance to be a reasonable exercise of the police power as a measure to prevent
flood damage the California court stated:
"The trial court properly disregarded plaintiffs' contention that the ... restriction
of their property was . . . a scheme . . . to depress the value of plaintiffs' beach
property so that it could eventually be acquired by the public authorities at the lowest
price possible, and meanwhile be used for public recreational purpose ....
"Plaintiffs' claims are entirely immaterial in view of the settled rule that 'the
purpose or motive of the city officials in passing an ordinance is irrelevant to any
inquiry concerning the reasonableness of the ordinance . . . If the conditions
justify the enactment of the ordinance, the motives prompting its enactment are of
no consequence. " Id. at 893-94.
Of course, if the only ground upon which the ordinance can be upheld is that
it will freeze the value of the property and thereby lower the cost of acquisition, the
ordinance is invalid. Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953); Messina v. Mayor of Lodi, 18 N.J.
Super. 503, 87 A.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d
34 (1951). Contra, Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936);
In the Matter of Opening Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Scatter-
good v. Comm'rs, 311 Pa. 490, 167 At. 40 (1933); In re Philadelphia Parkway, 295 Pa.
538, 145 Ad. 600 (1929). All of the latter grouping of cases dealt with restricting
property for the sole purpose of later acquiring it for street uses. The doctrine of
these cases may be limited to those facts. See Miller v. Beaver Falls, supra.
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decreased by airplane smoke, noise, or shock waves depends upon
whether the property owner's air space has been physically violated.10
The anomalous prejudice to adjoining landowners whose air space
is not invaded militates toward the scheme of compensation for any
actual damage posed in the former method.
CONCLUSION
The issue of the constitutionality of airport zoning ordinances
will continue to grow in importance as urban expansion leads to
airports which are surrounded by cities and as the amount of un-
inhabited land available for new airports decreases. If municipali-
ties are forced to pay compensation for necessary safety restrictions
upon land surrounding airports, the financial burden will be stag-
gering. This burden will in all probability be passed on to the air-
lines and thence to the traveling public through increased fares,
to the resulting detriment of aerial commerce. Since it is no longer
denied that airport zoning ordinances bear a substantial relationship
to the promotion of public safety and general welfare, and since
these ordinances can be upheld without subverting the policy of
the Causby and Griggs cases, airport zoning ordinances should be
measured by the same tests applied to zoning ordinances in general
and, unless clearly unreasonable in a given factual situation, should
be upheld.
"' See Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963); Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. CI. 1964).
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